Г	
1	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
2	DANVILLE DIVISION
3	CHRISTOPHER B. JULIAN, et al.,
4	Plaintiffs,
5	No. 4:13-CV-54 vs. Danville, Virginia
6	February 25, 2014 JAMES RIGNEY, et al.,
7	Defendants.
8	TRANSCRIPT OF MOTIONS HEARING
9	BEFORE THE HONORABLE JACKSON L. KISER UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.
10	APPEARANCES:
11	For the Plaintiffs:
12	CHRISTOPHER B. JULIAN, Pro Se
13	RENEE G. JULIAN, Pro Se 474 Orchard View Drive
14	Ararat, VA 24053 980-254-1295
15	For the Defendants: For the Defendant Johnson:
16	KARTIC PADMANABHAN KATHERINE M. DeCOSTER
17	U.S. Attorneys Office Office of the Attorney General BB&T Building 204 Abingdon Place
18	301 First Street, S.W. Abingdon, VA 24211 Roanoke, VA 24008 276-628-2759
19	540-857-2250
20	
21	Court Reporter: Carol Jacobs, Official Court Reporter
22	Registered Diplomate, Realtime Reporter U.S. District Court
23	1101 Court Street Lynchburg, VA 24504
	434-847-5722, ext. 3
2425	Proceedings recorded by mechanical stenography; computer-assisted transcription.
ر ک	compacer abbibeed cranberiperon.

```
(Call to Order of the Court at 10:00 a.m.)
1
 2.
             THE COURT: Good morning, folks.
 3
             We're here for several motions.
             Mr. Julian, are you going to handle the argument
5
    for you and your wife?
 6
             MR. JULIAN: Yes, sir.
 7
             THE COURT: You have to rise when you address the
8
    Court, please.
9
             MR. JULIAN: Oh.
                                Yes, sir.
10
             THE COURT:
                         I need to tell you, Mr. Julian, that it
11
    is awful hard for a person to represent himself. You really
12
    need a lawyer. But I understand you have got the absolute
13
    right to represent yourselves if you choose to.
14
             But -- having said this, I can give you some
15
    leeway, but I still have to abide by the rules and the
16
    statutes of the court and the government. So I cannot
17
    violate a rule, but I can certainly -- procedural-wise and
18
    presentation-wise can give you some slack, but cannot break
19
    the rules, even though I can bend them a little bit.
20
             MR. JULIAN: I understand, sir.
21
             THE COURT: All right. Just have a seat.
                                                         Thank
22
    you.
23
             MR. JULIAN:
                           Thanks, sir.
24
             THE COURT:
                         And, Mr. Padmanabhan, you have been
25
    before the Court before. And I know you, but I do not know
```

```
1
    Ms. DeCoster.
 2.
             MS. DeCOSTER:
                             Good morning, Your Honor.
 3
             THE COURT:
                         Ms. DeCoster, you are in the AG's
    office?
 4
5
             MS. DeCOSTER:
                             I am.
 6
             THE COURT:
                          And it is the first time that I have
    known that there was an office in Abingdon for the AG.
 7
8
             MS. DeCOSTER: There's just the two of us,
9
    actually.
10
             THE COURT: Do you handle the great southwest?
             MS. DeCOSTER:
11
                             We do.
12
             THE COURT:
                          Good for you.
13
             All right.
                          I guess we need to get to business.
14
    The -- I guess we'll do it by the numbers.
15
             Mr. Padmanabhan, you have more people to represent,
16
    so I will recognize you first.
17
             MR. PADMANABHAN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
18
             Your Honor, the federal defendants, which include
19
    seven individually named defendants as well as the USDA as
20
    an agency, have advanced several arguments in favor of their
21
    motion to dismiss and memorandum in support.
2.2
             And to summarize, it is basically failure to state
23
    a claim for multiple reasons, failure of subject matter
24
    jurisdiction both in terms of Bivens as well as FTCA,
25
    qualified immunity, sovereign immunity, and failure to
```

```
exhaust, which goes to subject matter jurisdiction.
1
 2
             First, in terms of Bivens -- and if the Court at
 3
    any time has -- wants to stop me because they have read the
    briefs, that's completely fine. And I'm happy to answer
5
    questions, if that's what the Court prefers.
 6
             THE COURT:
                         Well, we have certainly gone over the
    briefs and they are prolix, I guess I would say.
 7
                                                       They
    pretty well set forth your position.
                               Yes, Your Honor. Then I'll keep
9
             MR. PADMANABHAN:
    -- would the Court like to hear a brief summary or --
10
                         I'll leave that up to you. It is your
11
             THE COURT:
12
           You argue it the way you want to.
13
             MR. PADMANABHAN: Yes, Your Honor. Then I'll keep
14
    my argument fairly brief.
             First, in terms of -- I'll address it in terms of
15
16
    Bivens, pretty much how I addressed it in the brief.
                                                           First,
17
    in terms of Bivens, these individuals -- the federal
18
    defendants in individual capacities, first off, the USDA
    cannot be sued in a Bivens action. And in terms of Bivens,
19
20
    they should be dismissed out of hand. And the case law is
21
    pretty clear on that.
2.2
             In terms of the individual defendants, the seven
23
    individually named defendants, in the complaint the
24
    defendant (sic) talks about what all the individual
25
    defendants did in their roles as USDA employees. He doesn't
```

say anything about what they did to violate his constitutional rights. He doesn't say anything about what constitutional rights were violated. And so it just doesn't rise to a *Bivens*-type claim.

THE COURT: Well, in trying to figure out -- and I would agree that the complaint is not all that clear as to what rights are being asserted, but we have divined at least due process as being one of the rights asserted, both substantive and procedural.

MR. PADMANABHAN: Yes -- well, I think substantive due process goes more towards the state defendant. I think in terms of the federal defendants he just -- just I guess spells out procedural due process. And with respect to procedural due process, I think the hallmark is a right to be heard. And I think in this case he had multiple opportunities to be heard. He had the application; it was denied. It was sent to mediation; they couldn't reach an agreement. So then it went to the appeals counsel -- the appeal division. It was denied by the hearing officer, Mr. King. Then it went up to Director Mr. Klurfeld; and it was denied again. So the opportunity to be heard was definitely there.

The second part of it is there's just no property interest in this case. He does not have a right to loan proceeds such that there is in this event a due process

1 | violation.

So I think that argument with respect to Mr. Julian, the procedural due process issue is just not there.

The defendants also -- plaintiffs also claim common law conspiracy. They claim that these seven individuals acted in concert to deny him some rights. And, again, the pleadings just aren't there; the allegations just aren't there to support a common law conspiracy claim under Virginia law. He hasn't been able to establish or allege the required elements of a conspiracy claim.

The next argument, I guess, Your Honor, is qualified immunity. All of these seven defendants are current USDA employees. And they acted clearly within the scope of their employment. There has been no allegation that they did something so egregious, that fell outside of the outer bounds of their employment, such that there's not a clearly established right that has been violated. And so they are entitled to qualified immunity.

With respect to sovereign immunity it seems that the defendants have kind of abandoned that in the sense that in his reply he said that he's just suing the individuals in their official capacity for injunctive relief as opposed to monetary relief. So it seems the defendants -- the plaintiffs have abandoned their claim for money damages

against these individuals in their official capacities.

With respect to the FTCA claims, I think the law is pretty clear that the United States is the only proper defendant. And the seven individually named federal defendants are not a proper defendant in an FTCA claim, such that if this suit were to go forward, that the United States should be substituted for those seven defendants and it should be the Julians versus the United States.

But with respect to that, the Julians admit in their reply brief that they didn't exhaust, they never filed the administrative claim. And their excuse is that they didn't know they had to. But that is not an excuse. They never filed an administrative claim with the agency such that there was a failure to exhaust and this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over any FTCA claim.

Finally, with respect to the Administrative Procedures Act, the complaint was a little unclear in the sense of whether they are actually seeking judicial review of the merits of the underlying claim. And the United States' response to that, just in case the Court construed the complaint as seeking judicial review of the underlying claim and -- the law is basically that this Court has to give substantial deference to the administrative agency's decision, especially when it comes to administrative agency regulations.

In this case Director Klurfeld and Hearing Officer 1 2 King, they followed their procedures; they followed their 3 policy, their law; and they decided that the --THE COURT: I assume the plaintiffs' main argument 5 in that sphere is that the hearing officer chose the wrong 6 version of the regulations. MR. PADMANABHAN: Well, I think the hearing officer 7 -- well, I think the agency first denied it based on the 8 fact that their loan was for -- the intent of the loan was 9 to be used for -- instead of wages, for living expenses. 10 And I think the hearing officer found that wasn't a good 11 12 reason to deny it, and they misapplied it. So he didn't 13 affirm it, I guess, on that ground. 14 But he affirmed it on the fact that when you apply 15 for a loan for improvement, it has to be reasonable and 16 sufficient for your family and for your household --Well, that's the argument that the 17 THE COURT: 18 plaintiff is making. It should be reasonable or sufficient, not "and." 19 20 MR. PADMANABHAN: Right. And I think -- and I 21 think the other -- he also makes an argument that the fact 22 that it is not on farm property makes a difference, in that 23 it is located close to farm property somehow --24 THE COURT: Well, that's the next, I think, maybe a 25 flaw in the plaintiffs' argument. He says the house that is

1 in question is not even on the farm. 2. MR. PADMANABHAN: Right. 3 THE COURT: So how does it qualify for a farm loan? 4 MR. PADMANABHAN: Well, and I think the regulations 5 apply to property that is either on a farm or close -- or 6 adjacent or close to a farm. And so the regulations apply to both in the same manner. And so -- and I think that's 7 what the USDA found, that's what they applied, that's what 9 the agency applied. And it went to the hearing officer and 10 the director of the appeals division. And they both affirmed it on that ground, that -- I mean, the house that 11 12 they had built was over 4,000 square feet, had multiple 13 foyers, and it was just much more than necessary for a 14 family of three, which was at the time how many people were 15 living in that residence. 16 THE COURT: Would that be true if part of the house 17 was to be used for commercial purpose, such as a 18 wine-processing center? 19 Right. And I think that that's MR. PADMANABHAN: 20 what they were hoping to use at least part of their 21 residence for, as, you know, commercial. And I think they 22 also said that they wanted to use part of their residence to 23 rent out at some points. But I think the fact is it can't 24 be any greater than necessary to -- for a family of that 25 And it was just -- USDA found it was so -- just above size.

and beyond --

THE COURT:

not the use to which the property is going to be made?

MR. PADMANABHAN: Well, I think the size of the family is definitely a significant factor. Now, obviously, if it was a family of 10 or 15 living in that household, the space necessary would be far greater than if it was a family of three, for example. So I think that's definitely an important factor.

So the size of the family is the test,

And like I said, Your Honor, it is not even clear from their complaint if they are trying to seek judicial review of the merits of that claim, but the United States just interpreted it as such, actually to cover its bases, so we would not proceed on that ground alone, as opposed to the others.

And, finally, in their reply brief -- or, excuse me, response brief, the plaintiffs also allege a RICO violation in terms of the USDA being a racketeering-influenced corrupt organization. And the only mention of RICO in the original complaint is a one-line throwaway in paragraph 24 that the USDA, et al., is a racketeering-influenced corrupt organization. There's no allegation other than that in the complaint.

Now, in the response brief, pretty much the entire response brief is dedicated to alleging that the USDA is a

```
1
    RICO-type organization. But as argued in our reply, the
 2
    underlying predicates that they allege just don't apply
 3
    here.
           They allege obstruction of justice, but the statute
    they cite is influencing a juror or court officer.
5
    allege mail fraud. They allege fraud in violation of 18 USC
 6
    1028, but that applies to fraud in relation to
    identification documents. So they just don't -- they don't
 7
    allege the required elements necessary for a RICO violation.
9
             So for any of those reasons, Your Honor, the United
10
    States believes that the seven individually named defendants
    and the USDA should be dismissed.
11
12
             THE COURT: All right. Thank you, sir.
13
                                Thank you, Your Honor.
             MR. PADMANABHAN:
14
             THE COURT: Ms. DeCoster, we'll take up
15
    Ms. Johnson's motion now.
16
             MS. DeCOSTER: Your Honor, I am representing only
17
    Wanda Johnson, who is the state Mediation Program Director.
18
             As to Ms. Johnson, this case should be dismissed
19
    for similar reasons that our codefendants have already
20
    argued, for failure to state a claim and because Ms. Johnson
21
    is entitled to immunity.
2.2
             As to any due process violation --
             THE COURT: Well, it is somewhat amazing to me that
23
24
    she did not know that her job or position had been
25
    decertified.
```

MS. DeCOSTER: Your Honor, while she may have made a mistake, it is our argument that that doesn't create a cause of action. In particular as to --

THE COURT: Well, I'm more curious as to how she did not have that knowledge.

MS. DeCOSTER: Well, she has her reasons as to exactly what happened. Basically it comes down to just a simple mistake and oversight. But, once again, not anything that would create a cause of action.

As to any due process claims, we would also argue that the plaintiffs had an opportunity to be heard. They did have mediation and they did have an appeal hearing. In addition, it is our argument that filing alone does not confer a property interest.

As to -- in addition, even if there was a due process claim, our argument would be that Ms. Johnson is entitled to both absolute immunity and qualified immunity.

As to any fraud claim, we would argue, once again, that no harm occurred because the Julians did receive mediation and they also received an appeal hearing. In addition, the plaintiffs in no way relied on a statement by Ms. Johnson that caused them harm, once again, because there was no harm.

Finally, Your Honor, as to any conspiracy claim, we would argue again that they, first of all, failed to

```
properly plead fraud, so they can't then plead conspiracy to
1
 2
    defraud. And also we would argue that the complaint in no
 3
    way shows facts that suggest a concerted action. Therefore,
    they have utterly in their complaint failed to state any
5
    claim and Ms. Johnson is entitled to both absolute immunity
 6
    and qualified immunity.
             As already argued in the brief, the plaintiffs
 7
    brought up the RICO claim. There's no suggestion in the
8
9
    complaint of a RICO claim as to Wanda Johnson specifically.
10
             Your Honor, for those reasons, we would argue that
    this case should be dismissed.
11
12
             THE COURT:
                          Thank you, ma'am.
13
             All right, Mr. Julian, you get the chance to
14
    respond to them as well as argue your partial motion -- or
15
    motion for partial summary judgment.
16
                          Your Honor, are there any restrictions
             MR. JULIAN:
17
    as to what I can --
18
             THE COURT:
                         Excuse me?
19
             MR. JULIAN: Are there any restrictions as to what
20
    I can say in here or talk about, as there were in my
21
    hearing?
2.2
             THE COURT:
                         Well, you proceed along the way you had
23
    planned. And if you get out of bounds, I will tell you.
24
             MR. JULIAN:
                          Okay, sir.
25
             They say that it was -- that I had an opportunity
```

```
to grieve. And I woefully disagree with that as the, as I
1
 2
    would say, enterprise established their own set of rules by
    telling me that I could not present arguments of prejudicial
 3
    treatment, of negligence, of fraud. They ruled those out.
5
    So they have intentionally attempted, from the beginning, to
    separate the acts of the torts from the decision on the
    loan.
 7
             These gentlemen actually, we believe, created false
9
    documents upon our application in the very beginning and
10
    sent them to us in the mail with an attempt to sabotage our
    application.
11
12
             THE COURT:
                         Why would they do that?
13
             MR. JULIAN:
                          I don't know the answer to that, sir.
14
    I would love to know the answer --
15
                         Do you think they are just mean people?
             THE COURT:
16
             MR. JULIAN:
                           I don't know the answer.
                                                     I can only
17
    say that I have a multitude of potential reasons why they
18
    would do it. But why they did it, I don't know.
19
             THE COURT: You have run into what every citizen
20
    runs into, and that's bureaucracy.
21
             MR. JULIAN:
                          Bureaucracy.
2.2
             Well, Your Honor, I have here that letter.
23
             THE COURT:
                         Go ahead.
24
             MR. JULIAN: I have here the envelope that letter
25
    was received in.
```

```
This is not an evidentiary hearing.
1
             THE COURT:
 2
             MR. JULIAN:
                          I understand. But my point is -- is
 3
    that if you review the document, you can see that it appears
    to have been created or manufactured, and that it was sent
5
    to me with a post date of November 9th in an envelope
    postmarked October 22nd.
             THE COURT: Well, this is one of the things that
 7
8
    having a lawyer would have helped you with, because unless
9
    you have submitted that as an exhibit in advance, I cannot
    look at it.
10
                          Well, I did. Well, Your Honor, I have
11
             MR. JULIAN:
12
    requested in both of my -- all of my filings the opportunity
13
    to amend my pleading. And I understand that in the -- for
14
    justice, that I have that right.
15
             THE COURT: You don't have a right. I have the
16
    discretion of permitting you to do it if I think it will
17
    help, but you don't have a right to amend your pleadings.
18
             MR. JULIAN: Well, the court also asked us and told
19
    us in the filing of our complaint that we weren't to present
    any statutes, any legal arguments, or present any cases as
20
21
    evidence. So that --
2.2
             THE COURT:
                         Who told you that?
23
             MR. JULIAN:
                         It is on your website. It is on your
24
    complaint form.
25
             THE COURT:
                         I thought you were referring to my
```

order that was entered.

MR. JULIAN: No, sir. It is -- I actually called the clerk of court and asked them to explain to me the discrepancy, and the answer was yes.

THE COURT: Go ahead.

MR. JULIAN: It says if your complaint form is for a pro se complainant, not to do that. So it is a little hard for me -- and I quoted it at the time when I called the clerks -- to make this case without being able to provide those specifics.

We did the best we could -- and the federal courts for Miami, New York, and California all said that your -- a pro se's complaints should be limited to 25 pages. So we did the best we could to explain everything that took place and try to make our case without discussing the legal aspects.

We believe that this letter was followed up a second time with the fraudulent representations of the Code of Federal Regulations. We also believe, Your Honor, that what happened was that these guys created these documents in early October, which was exactly the time that Ms. Johnson's certification expired, and that being sent to her for mediation was the result of their negligence in creating these documents, to not know that she had lost her certification.

We know that in their rule books, in their rule 1 2 books, it tells them that when an individual requests 3 mediation, that those documents go to ALS, which is Administrative Legal Services in the Department of 5 Justice --6 THE COURT: Speak to me, Mr. Julian. You don't 7 talk to the other side. MR. JULIAN: Okay. 9 THE COURT: Your purpose there is to address me. 10 MR. JULIAN: Yes. We believe, Your Honor -- we don't know; of course, 11 12 we can't prove it, but we believe that Ms. Johnson was 13 instructed not to help us. We believe that that was an act 14 of the enterprise. 15 Ms. Johnson did not return a phone call. She did 16 not send us a letter notifying us that she had received our 17 request. We had return receipt from the mail, that she 18 received it on the 13th of December. She never once sent us 19 a letter, never once called us, never once emailed or made 20 any effort to contact us whatsoever. 21 On January -- in January, when I contacted 22 Ms. Johnson on my own accord, she indicated to us that she 23 would be helping us within a matter of days. But you have 24 to understand, Your Honor, at that point in time it was my 25 understanding that my 30 days were up, because they gave me

30 days from the November 28th to have mediation.

So I find it extremely incomprehensible that these folks who were responsible, from the University of Virginia, to handle mediation would not call or contact us at all, make any effort to contact us or any effort to help us in our request. It leads me to believe that Ms. Johnson knew the day she received our request that she wasn't eligible to handle it.

This was followed up by our having to chase down the information on the Internet as to what to do for mediation. And in those communications we were told that the farm chief didn't know.

THE COURT: Didn't what?

MR. JULIAN: That he didn't know. Those communications were -- it was communicated to us that the Virginia state farm chief was unaware that the state mediation program had not handled our request and that they had just lost their certification, although we -- that's hearsay, Your Honor. It came through the Internet.

So how do we know exactly when they knew that?

Because, according to the documentation, that certification was lost on October 1st. Ms. Johnson stated that she had lost that certification for failure to do her paperwork or to do her filings with the government. Those filings were due in August, Your Honor.

Well, how were you injured other than 1 THE COURT: 2 delayed in filing your claim? 3 MR. JULIAN: I'm sorry, sir? 4 THE COURT: How were you injured other than being 5 temporarily delayed in filing your claim? You ultimately 6 took the mediation. You ultimately availed the mediation --7 MR. JULIAN: Yes, sir, but that also took more than 8 two months. That's a long time. So you want \$14 million for that? 9 THE COURT: No, sir. I want \$14 million for this 10 MR. JULIAN: RICO activity. That's what I want the \$14 million for. 11 12 They put me out of business. They destroyed my 13 operation I spent seven years putting up. And they did this 14 by creating fraudulent documentations and supporting 15 regulations through Chevron deference, trying to, as he 16 said, give them leeway in their administration. 17 totally leaves out the fact that they did it all under 18 fraudulent terms. 19 Ms. Johnson did nothing to help us. And the State 20 of Virginia did nothing to help us. We handled our own 21 mediation processes. And those are very stressful 22 conditions. You do understand that in order to be eligible 23 for one of these loans you have to be in a situation where 24 you can't get credit elsewhere. It is a requirement. 25 These gentlemen didn't follow their procedures.

They didn't do the steps that were required of them, according to their own work manuals. And then they stepped outside of their jobs to create fraudulent documents to take us -- to do -- to deride our application.

And we believe that the RICO decided that they weren't going to help us with mediation, they would try to stop this whole thing, because they don't want to attach those torts to that loan; no harm, no foul.

And then each of these individuals after that has proceeded to aid and abet this operation in its ultimate goal, which is that itself: to keep that loan from being recognized and to keep these torts from attaching. And there is plenty of evidence to support the fact.

I need to turn to my notes for just a second, sir.

First, he has stated that we did not have the predicate acts. But the fact is that both of those documents were fraudulent and put in the mail. And that represents mail fraud.

Mr. Kraszewski proceeded in the hearing to give testimony to the fact that he had a conversation with me that he had never had. And that's perjury. He was sworn in, told that he was there under penalty of perjury. The hearing officer was a hearing officer for the National Appeals Division and was a hearing officer of an agency of the United States government. He made testimony to him,

false testimony. And he -- the hearing officer asked him to clarify it, to confirm it; and he did. And the documents show evidence, Your Honor, that that conversation never occurred.

Both the hearing officer and the director, their reviews are completely lacking in fact. They don't address the challenges that we made. They hide the truth. And the argument that was made up here that our house is not on the farm, well, Your Honor, they based -- the director based his decision on that. He based a bunch of his support on that. And the fact is the house is on the farm. To our knowledge, it has always been on the farm. And that is stated clearly in those -- in the original briefs. And how the director comes to the conclusion and makes the argument that the house isn't on the farm is beyond me. That is covered in the original complaint.

The other thing that is not -- the hearing officer, in the prehearing, he ruled out our opportunity to discuss the fact that there were items on there that were completely incompetent and false.

And the hearing officer, he actually read to us during that time period one of the regulations. I don't have it before me. But that regulation was that the act that causes us to breach the rule, he ruled that that rule would be applied as it was written at the time of our

```
application. But the item that actually broke that rule was
1
 2
    the design of the house. And the design of the house
 3
    happened eight years prior. But the rule says that it is
    supposed to be applied as it did at -- at the time --
5
             THE COURT: What if the house had been designed in
 6
    1889?
 7
             MR. JULIAN: Sir?
             THE COURT: Which rule would apply then?
8
             MR. JULIAN: Well -- if the house had been built in
9
10
    1899, which rule would apply?
                         Yeah. If that's your theory, is that
11
             THE COURT:
12
    the rule -- when you designed the house, was it in 2008?
13
             MR. JULIAN: Yes, sir. I wasn't even seeking a
14
    loan at that time.
15
             THE COURT: Well, what I'm saying, a hypothetical,
16
    Mr. Julian, to follow your theory, if the house had been
17
    built in 1899, you would have to apply whatever rule was in
18
    effect at that time.
19
             MR. JULIAN: If that was the case, Your Honor, I
20
    would be asking to purchase a house, not to build one.
21
    I didn't even ask to do that.
22
             THE COURT: Well, it seems to me that's a rather
23
    frivolous argument to say that when the house was designed
24
    is when the rule should be applied.
25
             MR. JULIAN: Well, Your Honor, they changed the
```

```
1
    rule.
 2.
             THE COURT:
                         Oh, they did. No question about that.
 3
             MR. JULIAN:
                           They changed it and they made it
 4
    incomprehensible. And not only is it incomprehensible, but
5
    the other pieces of that rule -- first off, we would argue
 6
    that that rule is not applicable at all to our case.
                                                           If you
    look at the document in terms of -- if you look at those
 7
8
    rules, the way they are written, in terms of reading them on
    the four-corner basis -- I have been an accountant and a
9
10
    programmer for 20 years. I spent my entire life doing
    financial analysis.
11
12
             THE COURT:
                          What is your view of the Tax Code?
13
             MR. JULIAN: What is my view of the Tax Code?
14
             THE COURT:
                          Yeah. Do you think it is written
15
    right?
16
             MR. JULIAN: I think it ought to be simple,
17
    simplified, extremely.
18
             THE COURT: Go ahead.
19
                           That's okay.
             MR. JULIAN:
20
             Your Honor, this is an attempt by this organization
21
    to manifest an enormous fraudulent scheme. It is their
22
    desire to separate those loan proceeds from the torts that
23
    occurred.
               And they did that when they separated out the
24
    items on the declination letter that were completely bogus.
25
    They did that when they took out the argument that negligent
```

```
-- as if negligence, fraud, and prejudicial treatment had
1
 2
    nothing to do with the decision. How can you -- that's
 3
    like, you know, the drunk color-blind man going through the
    red light, kills somebody, and the only thing that is
5
    accountable is that he went through the light. And the
    judge gives him deference because he's color-blind.
             And each of these individuals, Wanda Johnson, the
 7
8
    -- when we requested information -- in fact, we requested
9
    information specifically to try and identify proof, to do
10
    discovery, Your Honor, from our -- what do you call it when
    you request information from them?
11
12
             THE COURT: Are you talking about discovery
13
    procedures?
14
             MR. JULIAN: No, it wasn't discovery.
15
    Freedom of Information Act requests. When we made those
16
    requests, we asked for information that would prove our
17
    points. And they came back with information, but they never
18
    provided what we asked for. And we reserved the right to go
19
    to discovery to find these items. And we're more than
20
    willing to update our complaint.
21
             THE COURT: All right, sir. Thank you, Mr. Julian.
22
             MR. JULIAN: On the motion, Your Honor, to -- that
23
    I have --
24
             THE COURT: Your motion, go ahead and address it.
25
             MR. JULIAN:
                          Yes, sir. I understood that to be a
```

point of law, Your Honor, that contracts require that you have an agreement, that you have an understanding, that there is a compensation. There was no compensation. We ask the Court that that agreement be null and void. They don't have the capability to enter into that agreement. They can't abrogate their own immunity. And they have certainly requested it.

THE COURT: All right, sir.

MR. JULIAN: As to being allowed to have sovereign immunity, these gentlemen stepped outside their roles.

Ms. Johnson stepped outside of her job. They did not do their jobs. And we're more than happy to present all of the evidence to that fact.

As to judicial review, we did request judicial review in that. And we don't know what the -- how the Court views that request, because we do understand there's restraints in judicial review. But we prefer to have a jury decide whether that was actually a valid request or not, whether they actually misread those rules, because you have given Chevron deference to these -- to this gentleman back here to interpret that rule. And the hearing officers are told in their own handbooks that they are not to question your decisions. So you have given Chevron deference to these guys who started out with a fraudulent, negligent, prejudicial attempt to deny --

THE COURT: Mr. Julian, you are repeating yourself.

If you have got something new to say, I'll hear it. But

let's not go over old ground.

MR. JULIAN: So could the Court clarify for me whether perjury counts as obstruction of justice?

THE COURT: No, I'm not your lawyer.

MR. JULIAN: Okay. Well, as far as we're concerned, there's predicate acts. There are two specific examples of mail fraud; that Mr. Kraszewski did, in fact, commit perjury, and we consider that obstruction of justice. And we would argue, sir, that an entity and a government agency regularly identifies itself with written documents, that they recognize themselves as -- present themselves based on regulations, and that these guys sent to us a fraudulent document with the agency's letterhead on it and that inside that document they used false representations of the Code of Federal Regulations as authentication features of that document. And those features were fraudulent.

It is my understanding, Your Honor, that any time that they have committed a crime, they have violated my due process rights. It is also my understanding that Congress granted me the liberty to apply for these loans, provided that I had met the requirements, and that we met the requirements in every aspect, with the exception of this argument about our house. But we didn't ask them to build

us a house. And we don't believe that rule applies to making improvements to a house, particularly when -- if you look at the other facts as to what drove us to this point, to make this loan application.

THE COURT: All right. Thank you.

You can have a seat, Mr. Julian.

You get the last word.

MR. PADMANABHAN: Yes, Your Honor, just briefly.
Thank you.

First with respect to the motion for partial summary judgment, the summary judgment with respect to paragraph 11 of the complaint, and he's asking you to find that the two individuals at the USDA lacked the capacity to enter into that contract. That's necessarily a material issue -- a genuine issue of material fact. It cannot be decided on summary judgment. And that's not even withstanding the fact that we argue that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to even entertain the motion for summary judgment. And if the Court finds that there's no subject matter jurisdiction, then it cannot rule on the motion for summary judgment. But, like I said, even if there were subject matter jurisdiction, this is not an appropriate issue for summary judgment because it necessarily implicates a factual issue.

The plaintiffs also allege in their motion

fraudulent inducement. But in their reply to our memo in opposition they essentially abandon that claim altogether saying aside from -- aside from fraudulent inducement, essentially abandoning that theory altogether. So I think for those reasons summary judgment is inappropriate in this case.

With respect to plaintiffs' arguments in opposition to our motion to dismiss, I would say that plaintiffs again have just made conclusory allegations about fraud and what all of these people did in violation of the law. I mean, one thing to note is he states that violations are not --violations of law necessarily give rise to a claim, but qualified immunity does not -- that's not true. Just because an individual may violate the law does not necessarily mean he's not entitled to qualified immunity if he's performing his job as he sees fit.

And the plaintiffs also go to great lengths to allege negligence. But even assuming the seven individually named plaintiffs were negligent, that doesn't rise to a constitutional violation. Of course, we don't concede that they were negligent. But even assuming that was the case, there's still no Bivens cause of action, there's no cause of action in the Federal Tort Claims Act, there's no cause of action for negligence against these federal employees.

And, finally, in terms of RICO, again he just

```
alleges a RICO-type organization without any specificity as
1
 2
    to how the USDA or these seven individuals are a RICO-type
    enterprise. I mean, what did they do to be a RICO
 3
    organization?
                   I mean, using his logic, there must be
5
    thousands and thousands of people that the USDA fraudulently
 6
    denies loan applications to every year. And there's no
 7
    evidence to support that fact. Plaintiff just makes
    conclusory allegations that the USDA and these seven
9
    individuals are a RICO-type organization.
10
             And in terms of the predicate offenses, like I said
    in the brief, they just don't apply. The cases, the
11
12
    statutes he cites just don't apply in this case.
13
             If there's nothing further, Your Honor --
14
             THE COURT:
                          Thank you.
15
             MR. PADMANABHAN: -- thank you, Your Honor.
16
             THE COURT:
                         All right. For Ms. Johnson?
17
             MS. DeCOSTER:
                            Your Honor, my client isn't involved
18
    in the summary judgment motion. And unless you have any
19
    questions, I have nothing to add to my argument.
20
             THE COURT:
                         No further questions.
21
             All right. We'll give you a decision in writing.
22
    We'll try to sort this thing out.
23
             Let's adjourn.
         (Thereupon, at 10:40 a.m., these proceedings were
24
25
    adjourned.)
```

```
I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript
 1
 2
    from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.
 3
             /s/ Carol Jacobs
                                            March 25, 2014
         Official Court Reporter
 4
                                                 Date
 5
 6
 7
 8
 9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```